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How the RICO Monster Mauled Wall Street
L. Gordon Crovitz *
I. Introduction
On Wall Street, the 1980s will be remembered for an investment
banker and a U.S. Attorney armed by the Justice Department with broad
use of a killer statute. The banker, instead of sticking to the usual activi-
ties of underwriting and brokerage made an epoch discovery about the
true measure of high-yield bonds, now called junk bonds. Partly as a re-
sult, hundreds of small firms found access to capital they never had
before, more jobs were created in the U.S. than in Europe and Japan
combined, the economy boomed. There was also the ready capital to
fund the market for corporate control-takeovers, leveraged buy-outs,
restructurings-that serves as the ultimate solution to the problem of the
separation of ownership and control of firms.
This caused great dislocations and in some quarters great anger.
Competitors resented the success of the upstart firm Drexel Burnham
Lambert. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Attor-
neys' Office in Manhattan decided that Michael Milken had to be brought
down. There was nothing illegal in junk bonds or hostile takeovers, but
RICO was the way out of this irrelevancy. His hundreds of thousands of
trades were analyzed. Despite the fact that the best prosecutors could
find Were alleged regulatory offenses, almost none of which had ever
before been treated criminally, and where any victims remain very hard
to find, RICO was the perfect club. Call him a racketeer, guilty of
"frauds" and call him greedy, a sleaze, and see if ajury will disagree.
As seen from this perspective, as at least some of Wall Street does,
RICO looms large indeed. Wall Street traders, bankers, analysts, ac-
countants and others paid close attention to the use of RICO. Many of
them, with good reason, view themselves as there-but-for-the-grace-of-
God defendants. No one can know whether they may inadvertently some
day become defendants under the vague RICO predicates of mail fraud,
wire fraud or securities fraud. They see the forest and not just the trees.
They see a forbidding RICO forest, not a few twisted and perhaps imper-
fect trees as it is often described by courts and commentators.
This paper will offer a view of RICO from Wall Street, so a history
from the Wall Street perspective of this title of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 is appropriate before describing how it was used on
Wall Street and with what effects. RICO began in 1970 as a well-inten-
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tioned law aimed at strengthening the hand of prosecutors against or-
ganized crime syndicates, but Wall Street has learned that RICO, without
congressional intent, has become a tool of both prosecutors and private
plaintiffs against legitimate businesses. Note that RICO's more precise
legislative name is Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.1
Despite its current use in these ways, RICO is not a law aimed at hand-
cuffing investment bankers at their desks to force compliance with the
securities laws or at granting jurisdiction to federal courts to hear state
common law actions for damages in suits arising in situations as diverse
as interpreting dispositions under wills, divorce actions and property
damaged during civil disobedience. Instead, RICO is part of a larger stat-
ute aimed entirely at organized crime and organized criminals. The text
and legislative history makes clear that the statute was aimed directly at
the Mafia, La Cosa Nostra, the Mob. 2
Despite this fundamental context for RICO, by the mid-1980s, many
criminal RICO cases were aimed at a new breed of alleged criminals that
had no ties to organized crime. On the civil side, the American Bar Asso-
ciation (ABA) reported that more than ninety percent of the RICO cases
between private parties were for damages against legitimate businesses.3
How has this happened? Some RICO defenders now argue that
RICO was intended as a broad weapon, not limited to organized crime.
This seems highly unlikely. One of the original proposals was that Con-
gress include in the Organized Crime Control Act a simple provision to
accomplish the goal of strengthening the hand of prosecutors against the
mobsters that had long confounded law enforcement. This proposal was
simply to make it a crime to belong to the Mafia, La Cosa Nostra or other
organized criminal syndicates. Rep. Mario Biaggi, Democrat of New
York, offered a provision that would have simply read, "It shall be unlaw-
ful for any person to be a member of a Mafia or a Las Cosa Nostra Or-
ganization." He defined these organizations as "nationally organized
criminal groups composed of persons of Italian ancestry forming an un-
derworld government ruled by a form of broad of directors, who direct
or control the national operation of a criminal enterprise in furtherance
of a monopolistic trade-restraining criminal conspiracy."'4 This ptoposal
had its own problems, but would have had the great virtue of aiming the
law with some precision at its intended targets.
Instead, we have a statute that refers to "racketeering," "patterns,"
"predicate acts" and "enterprises." Why? The Biaggi proposal was de-
feated not because Congress decided to broaden the targets under the
anti-organized crime law, but because Congress wanted to ensure that
the Supreme Court would not invalidate the' entire law. The problem
identified at the time was that the Supreme Court had prohibited "status
1 Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941, 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1988)) [hereinafter RICO].
2 This section is based on Crovitz, RICO: The Legalized Extortion and Shakedown Racket, in THE
RICO RAcKEr (G. McDowell ed. 1989).
3 Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force, 1985 A.B.A. SEc. CoRP. BANKING & Bus. L. 56
[hereinafter Civil RICO Task Force Report].
4 Id. at 118.
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crimes" as unconstitutional, and so, it was argued, a law prohibiting
membership in the Mafia would be unconstitutional. Congress was ad-
vised by legal scholars instead to craft a law that would apply to the activ-
ities of mobsters, without making the crime mere membership in the
Mob. The commission of two of the listed predicate acts within a ten-year
period would establish an enterprise as a racketeering enterprise, and
subject its members to the rigors of RICO enforcement.
The decision to craft a law that would catch mobsters indirectly by
defining their classic activities led to two unintended consequences.
The first was that proponents of the law were forced by opponents
to make statements that seemed to suggest that the law was not what it
was-an indirect way of establishing a status crime. Civil libertarians who
opposed tougher laws even for mobsters raised the specter of RICO as a
status crime that unfairly and unconstitutionally targeted individuals in
fact for belonging to the Mob-a status crime by another name. As a
result, several congressmen assured opponents of the legislation and,
not incidentally, future judges interpreting the constitutionality of the
law, that of course others would also be caught by the law. One of the
leading supporters, Senator John McClellan, Democrat of Arkansas, de-
fended his bill by saying, "[T]his objection seems to imply that a double
standard of civil liberties is permissible .... Has the [American Civil
Liberties] [U]nion forgotten that the Constitution applied to those en-
gaged in organized crime just as it applies to those engaged in white-
collar or street crime? S. 30 must, I suggest, stand or fall on the constitu-
tional questions without regard to the degree to which it is limited to
organized crime cases." 5
Compare this with the broader purposes of the law. The statement
of findings in the preface to the Organized Crime Control Act make it
clear that the only relevance to legitimate business is as a plaintiff against
organized criminals or as a conduit for the financial activities of mob-
sters. The preface is worth citing for the utter absence of any reference to
ninety percent of the civil cases now brought under RICO:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States
is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annu-
ally drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful
conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organ-
ized crime derives a major portion of its power through money ob-
tained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan
sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distri-
bution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of
social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to
infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to sub-
vert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activi-
ties in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic
system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, inter-
fere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign
commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general
welfare of the Nations and its citizens; and (5) organized crime contin-
5 111 CONG. REC. 18,913-14 (1970).
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ues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of
the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence
necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions'or remedies to bear on
the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and be-
cause the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are un-
necessarily limited in scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evi-
dence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and
by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the
unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
6
Despite Senator McClennan's assurances to the ACLU, one looks in
vain to any reference to the prospect of RICOing legitimate business ex-
cept where it is used as a conduit for organized crime.
Instead, the Senate Judiciary Committee report on the RICO provi-
sion makes clear that its only impact ofn legitimate business was meant to
be where mobsters used ordinary commerce for their illicit ends. The
report said that RICO "has as its purpose the elimination of the infiltra-
tion of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations
operating in interstate commerce.";7 That the target was organized crime
corrupting legitimate businesses and not legitimate businesses violating
other laws is clear from the Senate report's explanation that RICO was
needed because organized crime had infiltrated legitimate businesses.
"In most cities, organized crime now dominates the fields ofjukebox and
vending machine distribution," the report said.
8
Racketeers in one midwestern city control, or have large interests in
89 businesses with total assets of more than $800 million and annual
receipts in excess of $900 million. Laundry services, liquor and beer
distribution, nightclubs, food wholesaling, record manufacturing, the
garment industry and a host of other legitimate lines of endeavor have
been invaded and taken over.9
The second perverse result of the decision to use predicate "racke-
teering" acts instead of simply prohibiting membership in an organized
crime organization was that, in retrospect, RICO gave prosecutors and
plaintiff lawyers unprecedented powers to bring cases based on minimal
or no evidence. RICO replaced the already relaxed legal requirement to
establish conspiracy with the simple accusation of two predicate acts.
Moreover, the drafting of RICO did not limit the predicate acts to loan-
sharking, embezzlement, extortion, murder or lacing concrete shoes
onto a competitor and dumping him in the East River. Instead, and
largely as afterthoughts with very little legislative history, three alleged
activities were added that could apply to mobsters, but also apply to
thousands of legitimate businesses, certainly including Wall Street in-
vestment banks, accountants and others involved in the capital markets:
mail fraud, wire fraud, and securities fraud.
6 116 CONG. REc. 602 (1970).
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This is especially significant now that the ABA has determined that
more than ninety percent of the private, civil RICO lawsuits are against
legitimate businesses, labor unions, spouses in divorce actions and heirs
in challenges to dispositions under wills. It is also significant because the
ABA found that claims of mail fraud, wire fraud or securities fraud have
become the typical predicate acts for RICO. Some forty-four percent of
the cases rely solely on allegations of mail or wire fraud. Another thirteen
percent rely primarily on mail or wire fraud, but also allege another
predicate act, while twelve percent focus on another predicate act but
also allege mail or wire fraud. Thus more than two-thirds of the cases
include mail or wire fraud charges. The ABA report found that about
thirty-five percent of the civil RICO cases rely solely or primarily on alle-
gations of securities fraud. Interestingly, no predicate acts aside from
mail fraud, wire fraud or securities fraud occurred in as many as two per-
cent of the cases. 10 Justice Thurgood Marshall has noted that:
The effects of making a mere two instances of mail or wire fraud po-
tentially actionable under civil RICO are staggering, because in recent
years the Courts of Appeals have tolerated an extraordinary expansion
of mail and wire fraud statutes to permit federal prosecution for con-
duct that some had thought was subject only to state criminal and civil
law. 11
Mail and wire fraud are the heirs to a troubling tradition in the American
legal system-the catch-all criminal provision that may do justice so long
as prosecutors use great care and exercise unusual discretion, but can
become effective rubber hoses in the hands of overly zealous prosecu-
tors. RICO's predecessors include the broad charge of conspiracy, which
de-emphasizes the traditional mens rea requirement in the Anglo-Ameri-
can justice system. By 1925, Judge Learned Hand referred to the con-
spiracy charge as "the darling of the modem prosecutor's nursery.' 2 By
lowering the required proof of conspiracy to the allegation of predicate
acts, RICO is the darling of today's prosecutor's nursery.
This is especially so because mail and wire fraud is itself a powerful
tool in the hands of prosecutors. "Fraud" is inherently ambiguous, which
makes it a troubling part of any criminal code. It has been a fundamental
notion of our law since the time of Blackstone that the rule of law is
undermined by vague criminal laws-laws that are impossible to follow
but very easy to break inadvertently. Allegations of mail or wire fraud are
nothing more than allegations that some "fraud" was committed though
the mails or telephone wires. Prosecutors have long viewed the mail and
wire fraud statutes as powerful tools. Former prosecutor Jed Rakoff has
written that "[t]o federal prosecutors on white collar crime, the mail
fraud statute is our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our
Cuisinart-and our true love."' 3 Almost no business-legitimate or ille-
10 See Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 3, at 57.
11 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 502 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 791 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., dissenting)).
12 Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1925).
13 Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DuQ. L. REv. 771 (1980).
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gitimate-is done without letters, FAXes or modems. This means that
nearly any allegation of "fraud" can now become a.RICO case.
There is a fascinating history to the inclusion of securities fraud as a
predicate act under RICO at the same time as mail fraud and wire fraud
were added to the list of predicates. The Department ofJustice had testi-
fied against an earlier version of RICO that did not include these three
predicates arguing that even without these, the predicates, including
state law offenses, were already "too broad and would result in a large
number of unintended applications." 14 RICO did not include any refer-
ence to securities fraud until the final version of the law to be reported
out of the Senate Judiciary Committee in December, 1969.15
This timing is crucial to understanding the purpose of including se-
curities fraud because it was during this period that law-enforcement au-
thorities first became concerned about the involvement of criminal
syndicates in the securities markets, especially in the stealing and resel-
ling of securities. The President of the New York Stock Exchange, Robert
Haack, testified before a House Committee in February, 1969, about a
dramatic increase in thefts of securities allegedly by criminal syndi-
cates. 16 In March, 1969, Attorney General John Mitchell testified that
organized crime syndicates had even begun to use their huge financial
resources to manipulate the prices of some securities. 17 The modus
operandi apparently was quite simple. Senator Roman Hruska explained
that "persons with known underworld ties" would penetrate an "estab-
lished brokerage house" and begin to circulate rumors to run up the
prices of certain shares and engage in other manipulation.' 8 In other
words, the target was not securities fraud by legitimate brokers or bank-
ers, but fraud against legitimate firms in the securities business by mob-
sters. Put another way, there is no evidence that Congress intended to
replace the Securities Act of 1933 and 1934 with RICO; fraud in the sale
of securities by regulated brokers was already well covered by the crimi-
nal code.
In a quirk of history, the chairman of the American Bar Association
ad hoc group that produced the ABA's 1985 report on civil RICO, Ar-
thur F. Mathews, was the deputy associate director for enforcement in
the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1969. The ABA report in-
cludes his recollection of why the SEC supported the inclusion of securi-
ties fraud as a predicate act. "The SEC's views in 1969 were predicated
on a belief by its enforcement staff that organized criminal syndicates
were becoming involved in manipulations of listed securities traded on
major national securities exchanges, particularly the American Stock Ex-
change," the report said. 19 The purpose was thus clearly not to facilitate
14 See Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 3, at 99.
15 116 CONG. REC. 972 (1970).
16 Securities Markets Agencies: Hearings on the Administration of the Laws Pertaining to the Regulation of the
Securities Markets by the Administrative Agency and by the Seif-Regulatory Agencies Involved Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 137
(1969).
17 115 CoNG. REC. 5,874 (1969).
18 113 CONG. REc. 17,998 (1967).
19 See Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 3, at 99 n.130.
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law enforcement against legitimate brokerages, but only against organ-
ized crime that used legitimate brokerages.
Moreover, the ABA report made clear that the SEC did not antici-
pate the private civil RICO suits alleging securities losses that have now
become so common. "No consideration was given by the SEC at the time
to the possibility that the statutes when eventually enacted might contain
an express private cause of action for treble damages on behalf of vic-
tims," the ABA report said, "which might in any way implicate or replace
the traditional securities statutes." 20
Some critics feared at the time RICO was passed that it could be
misinterpreted as applying to securities fraud by legitimate businesses.
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the New York
County Lawyers Association both testified against RICO on these
grounds. The latter made the point explicitly that the statute could some
day confuse securities law with this new law aimed at organized crime.
"Fraud in the sale of securities," the group testified, "is simply not sy-
nonymous with racketeering activity." 2' How times change.
II. Whatever Happened to RICO Prosecutorial Guidelines?
The use of RICO in the 1980s by federal prosecutors, especially by
former U.S. Attorney for Manhattan, Rudolph Giuliani, against alleged
white-collar criminals, especially alleged inside traders, completely con-
founds the purpose, text and history of the statute. Although Mr. Giu-
liani also used RICO with some success against Mafia families in several
cases, he revolutionized law enforcement by applying RICO's draconian
provisions for pre-trial restraints and government-approved allegations
of "racketeering" to entirely new kinds of cases and defendants. His
most highly publicized insider trading cases, especially his investigation
of the investment banking firm of Drexel Burnham Lambert, became
RICO cases. This occurred despite alternative remedies under the securi-
ties laws and despite the fact that there has never been any accusation
that organized syndicates were involved in any way with these cases.
The Giuliani cases also defied the very unusual rules of prosecutorial
discretion that had been established and made formal by the Department
ofJustice in 1981. The Department ofJustice Guidelines for RICO Pros-
ecutions is a remarkably detailed, several-hundred-page set of instruc-
tions for all federal prosecutors setting out rigid, national rules of
prosecutorial discretion. The provision states that unlike nearly all other
cases, all RICO prosecutions by U.S. attorneys must be approved by the
Department of Justice. These Guidelines were accepted as administra-
tively binding policy, and as such both define the interpretation of RICO
by the unitary executive branch of government and are intended to de-
fine improper uses of RICO.
The preface to the Guidelines makes clear that by 1981 law-enforce-
ment officials understood that while RICO had a narrow purpose, it had
20 Id. at 99-100 n.30.
21 Id. at 112.
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been drafted in such a way as to possibly allow abusive prosecutions if
ambitious U.S. attorneys were not kept in close check:
Despite the broad statutory language of RICO and the legislative in-
tent that the statute ". .. shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purpose," it is the policy of the Criminal Division that RICO
be selectively and uniformly used. It is the purpose of these guidelines
to make it clear that not every case in which technically the elements of
a RICO violation exist will result in the approval of a RICO charge. 22
On the contrary, the Guidelines stress that there must be a uniform un-
derstanding that the powerful weapon of RICO must only be applied to
the rather narrow set of cases that Congress originally envisioned in its
law against organized crime.
The Guidelines make it very clear that prosecutors are to err on the
side of exercising discretion, not making headlines. "It is not the policy
of the Criminal Division to approve 'imaginative' prosecutions under
RICO which are far afield from the congressional purpose of the RICO
statute," the Guidelines warn. 23 "Stated another way, a RICO count
which merely duplicates the elements of proof of a traditional Hobbs Act,
Travel Act, mail fraud, wire fraud, gambling or controlled substances
cases, will not be added to an indictment unless it serves some special
RICO purpose as enumerated herein." 24 That is, even for cases alleging
traditional mobster activities including gambling and drugs, prosecutors
are warned not automatically to bring RICO charges as well. How much
less appropriate are cases alleging crimes that Congress would never
have imagined could be RICO counts? The Guidelines emphasized that
the purpose of RICO was quite narrow. "The purpose of the RICO stat-
ute," the Guidelines said, "is 'the elimination of the infitration of organ-
ized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in
interstate commerce.' "25
Furthermore, the Guidelines stress that imaginative uses of RICO
would surely lead to calls to repeal the provision. RICO provides the
potential for abuse or overuse, the Guidelines acknowledged. 26 Injudi-
cious use of the statute would reduce its impact in cases where it is truly
warranted. For this reason, it is the policy of the Criminal Division that
RICO be selectively and uniformly used.27 In its section on the dangers
of prosecutors using RICO to sue private parties for damages, the Guide-
lines noted that the department's judicious and restrained use of RICO
has been a significant factor in fending off attacks by groups who might
like to see the statute's provisions sharply diluted. As a result of the Giu-
liani prosecutions (which, like all RICO cases, had to be approved by the
Department ofJustice), there is reason to wonder whether these Guide-




25 Id at § 9-110.100 (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969)).
26 Id at § 9-110.200.
27 Id.
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lines remain in effect or are in abeyance, gathering dust pending new
direction from the Attorney General.
III. The RICO Monster Sicked on Wall Street
Despite the assurances in the Guidelines of "judicious" and "re-
strained" prosecutions for all crimes, beginning in the 1980s federal
prosecutions are more accurately described as "injudicious" and "unin-
hibited," especially in the white-collar field. The most aggressive use of
RICO was by Mr. Giuliani.
An early departure from traditional anti-mobster RICO cases came
in 1984 in an extraordinarily complex case Mr. Giuliani brought against
the wealthy oil trader, Marc Rich, who remains in Switzerland rather than
defend himself from these charges in a U.S. criminal court. In 1983, Mr.
Giuliani brought a fifty-one count indictment against Mr. Rich. The accu-
sations were based on an alleged scheme to defraud the Internal Reve-
nue Service whereby Marc Rich & Co. International purchased barrels of
U.S. oil, then under Energy Department price controls, and resold the oil
through a chain of oil resalers. The government claimed that this scheme
allowed oil to be reclassified under the arcane Jimmy Carter-era price
controls as uncontrolled oil that could be sold at higher prices. 28 Despite
the underlying issue of the complex oil price controls, this was essentially
a tax case. Mr. Giuliani charged that Mr. Rich and his colleagues
schemed to defraud the IRS of a record $50 million in unpaid taxes.
The main issue in the indictment was essentially whether income was
attributable to a U.S. company or to a foreign holding company-a
rather straightforward and commonplace issue in tax law usually brought
as a civil, not criminal, case. Yet this was a criminal case raising tax ques-
tions that was not brought or styled primarily as a tax case. Instead,
count one of the indictment was "the racketeering activity" and count
two was "racketeering." There were also charges of mail and wire fraud.
The Department of Justice Guidelines did not at the time expressly con-
fine the practice of elevating tax cases to RICO cases-this would be ex-
pressly and narrowly limited in 1989 after later tax-as-RICO cases
attracted unwelcome attention-but there was the strong suggestion that
prosecutors should, at the very least, exercise special caution in linking
criminal tax cases with such broad racketeering charges. Department su-
pervisors, the Guidelines say, will not approve a proposed RICO indict-
ment that contains as predicates mail fraud charges concerning federal
tax evasion or related violations, unless the use of those charges is first
cleared with the Criminal Section of the Tax Division. 2
9
The most notorious of Wall Street RICO cases arose from the three-
year investigation by Mr. Giuliani of the investment bank Drexel Burn-
ham Lambert and its leading employee, Michael Milken. The
prosecutorial abuses under RICO that led to the settlement of charges by
Drexel Burnham Lambert can only be understood after analyzing what
28 See Goldsworth, The Marc Rich Indictments: Evading Price Controls on U.S. Oil, TAXEs INT'L
(London) (Nov. 1983).
29 See infra Appendix A, at 1069-70.
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became the test case, the investigation of a comparatively small securities
house, Princeton/Newport Partners Ltd. On close inspection, the
Princeton/Newport case was eerily similar to the Marc Rich case in being
essentially a tax case elevated to a RICO case.
The core of the case against Princeton/Newport was that the firm
had created fraudulent tax breaks by arranging false long-term capital
gains and short-term capital losses. Despite this, the indictment in 1988
was not restricted to or even labelled as alleged tax violations. Instead,
the indictment charged racketeering, conspiracy, mail fraud and wire
fraud. The defendants argued in vain that at most this should be a civil
tax case. Indeed, it is highly ironic and rather alarming that after bring-
ing the indictment, the federal government informed partners of
Princeton/Newport that the firm had in fact overpaid its federal taxes
during the years covered by the indictment.
Why was Princeton/Newport brought as a RICO case instead of as a
tax case? Defense lawyers made the very unusual and serious charge that
Mr. Giuliani RICOed the firm not because of the heinousness of the al-
leged violations, but because RICO could be the rubber hose to bludg-
eon Princeton/Newport officials into testifying against bigger fish,
including Drexel Burnham Lambert's Mr. Milken. Under this view, Mr.
Giuliani's twin purposes in using RICO against Princeton/Newport were
to force a plea bargain and to coerce testimony. In addition to Mr.
Milken, Princeton/Newport traded with another investment banker
whose case stymied Mr. Giuliani. In that case he had arrested three bank-
ers on insider trading charges, and had one handcuffed in his Wall Street
office, only to have to drop the case after he failed to gather enough
evidence to go to trial. The three bankers included Robert Freeman, a
banker at Goldman Sachs, who had traded with Princeton/Newport.
"The primary purpose [of the RICO prosecution] in this case is to
coerce the testimony of the defendants against principals at Drexel Burn-
ham Lambert and Goldman Sachs," said lawyers for Princeton/Newport
officials.30 One defense lawyer told The Wall Street Journal soon after
the indictments that a prosecutor had told him that "we have no real
interest" in Princeton/Newport, but that the firm "can help us with
Drexel Burnham and others.... If you cooperate, fine. If you don't, we
are going to roll right over you to get to where we want to go."'s Prose-
cutors deny these comments, although this was the perceived scenario
that soon followed when Princeton/Newport was driven into liquidation
before it could defend itself in court.
Part of what is so troubling about trying to use RICO to coerce testi-
mony is that this can be akin to training a howitzer on a flea. The preface
to the Guidelines recognizes this problem by warning against threatening
RICO to coerce testimony or cooperation. "It should be noted that only
in exceptional circumstances will approval be granted when RICO is
30 Crovitz, RICO's Broken Commandments, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1989, at A14, col. 3.
31 Stewart & Hertzberg, Five of Princeton/Newport's Partners Indicted in Racketeering, Fraud Case, Wall.
St.J., Aug. 5, 1988, at A3, col. 2.
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sought merely to serve some evidentiary purpose," the preface says.32
One concern is that rather than urge testimony against a target, a prose-
cutor threatening RICO may be just as likely to suborn perjury instead.
This specter was also raised by Chicago U.S. Attorney Anton Valukas,
who in the early days of the commodities investigation in early 1989 re-
portedly sent agents to the homes of traders threatening RICO if they
did not agree to testify against their higher-up colleagues. Commodities
traders recounted intimidating experiences. "You like your house, you
like your car?" someone asks after knocking on the door at midnight.
"Your wife likes her jewels? Well, they're ours now."
33
Using RICO to coerce testimony creates another serious problem in
the context of alleged white-collar crimes. This is that the pre-trial asset
forfeiture provisions work hardships on legitimate businesses that would
not have nearly the same coercive effect on organized crime syndicates.
Indeed, the hardships are so great that it is a reminder that Congress
never intended these provisions to apply as against anyone but mobsters.
Again, the Princeton/Newport case is instructive.
The possibility of pre-trial restraints on assets is clearly one of the
most powerful tools for a prosecutor under RICO. This reverses the nor-
mal presumption of innocence and raises serious due process questions.
The Guidelines say that pre-trial forfeiture of assets to guarantee the
payment of later judgments may be appropriate where a defendant might
otherwise begin to dispose of them or transfer them to conceal them
from the government.3 4 Clearly, the underlying purpose of this pre-trial
remedy is that organized crime, with its foreign bases of operation, has
traditionally been able not just to hide its assets but also to secretly trans-
fer its assets outside the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. While this pre-trial
procedure might make some sense for cases against a Mafia family or a
corrupt foreign official indicted in U.S. courts, it has had perverse effects
when used against legitimate businesses.
The pressure on Princeton/Newport became unbearable when Mr.
Giuliani announced that he would seek to seize assets of the firm, but left
the total amount to be bonded unclear. Indeed, the firm did not remain
in business long enough to be able to defend itself in court. When Mr.
Giuliani went after the firm's assets, the financial backers of the firm
made the prudent calculation that they should quickly pull their funds
out. These backers included McKinsey & Co., the management consul-
tants, and the Harvard University endowment, which had been
Princeton/Newport's two largest investors. Fund managers for these in-
stitutions asked themselves-and their lawyers-whether they could jus-
tify the risk that their funds might be frozen or seized. They were told
that a RICO case is different from any other prosecution because inves-
tor funds could be attached.
Princeton/Newport officials warned that the hemorrhage of invest-
ment funds would be fatal to a business that depended on the flow of
32 See Guidelines, supra note 22 at § 9-110.200.
33 The Kinder, Gentler Hog Butcher, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1989 at A14, col. 1 (editorial).
34 See Guidelines supra note 2, at § 9-110.410.
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funds from investors for its existence. Far from the Guideline's refer-
ence to disposing of assets before trial or beginning to "dispose of them
or transfer them to conceal them from the government," Princeton/New-
port pleaded with prosecutors to be able to do the opposite. It wanted to
hold onto investor funds so that it could stay in business. It even posted a
bond to guarantee that funds would be available for any possible
judgment.
In the end, the threat of pre-trial seizures of assets drove investor
funds out of Princeton/Newport and drove the firm into liquidation-
before it was able to defend itself in court from the charges. The result is
explained in an excerpt from Lewis Carroll's Alice's Adventures in
Wonderland:
"Let the jury consider their verdict," the King said, for about the twen-
tieth time that day.
"No, no!" said the Queen, "Sentence first-verdict afterward."
"Stuff and nonsense!" said Alice loudly. "The idea of having the sen-
tence firstl"
"Hold your tongue!" said the Queen, turning purple.
"I won't!" said Alice.
"Off with her head!" the Queen shouted at the top of her voice. No-
body moved.35
In the case of Princeton/Newport, the "sentence first" was the death
penalty.
Once Princeton/Newport officials got their day in court, another se-
rious problem with RICO quickly became apparent. Defenders of RICO
often say that it is modeled on the antitrust laws, but in at least one fun-
damental sense the two legal regimes are very different. The Supreme
Court has interpreted the Sherman Act to require an "antitrust injury"
even though the statute itself does not expressly include this require-
ment.3 6 Yet in Sedima and ever since, the courts have not required any
specific "racketeering injury." Such an injury is not expressly required by
the language of RICO, and the Princeton/Newport trial is a perfect ex-
ample of the harm done by its failure to require prosecutors who bring a
RICO case to allege and prove a racketeering injury-or, for that matter,
an injury of any kind.
The conviction this past summer of several former Princeton/New-
port officials on RICO charges was itself the culmination of an extraordi-
nary strategy by the U.S. Attorney's office. The underlying crime alleged
was a violation of the tax code by some year-end tax-driven trades by the
firm. The defendants argued that these tax-straddle trades were routine.
What is most striking from reading the several thousand pages of the
trial transcript is how very little discussion there was of the tax code, and
how many rather vague accusations were made by the prosecution that
tax-motivated trades are somehow inherendy suspicious and criminal.
Listen to the prosecutor in the case summarizing his case to the jury:
"You don't need a fancy tax law expert because common sense tells you
35 L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 160-61 (M. Gardner ed. 1960).
36 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
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it's fraudulent, it's phony .... Doesn't it feel wrong? Doesn't it sound
sleazy? If it sounds sleazy it's because it is sleazy. Your common sense
tells you that."
37
But it turns out that the tax issues were actually rather.complex, far
more complex than the jury ever learned. Boris Bittker, the emeritus
Yale Law tax expert, was prepared to testify that these trades were not
criminal and indeed were perfectly Koutine trades locking in recognition
of gains and losses. After the prosecution objected, however, he was not
allowed to testify. They thought it might confuse the jury about the law.
In other words, RICO means never having to find substantive criminal
offenses any more specific than "fraud" or "sleaze."
In an article in The Wall Street Journal, I likened the Princeton/New-
port prosecution to a scene from the classic Western film, "Treasure of
the Sierra Madre." Humphrey Bogart and his pals are guarding some
gold when they're surrounded by Mexican bandits. One of the bandits
says: "We are the Federales. You know, the mounted police." Bogart says:
"If you're the police, where are your badges?" The bandit replies:
"Badges? We ain't got no badges. We don't need no badges. I don't have
to show you any stinkin' badges." 38
Now we have a federal prosecutor in the Princeton/Newport case
who assures the jurors that they don't need any "fancy tax law expert
because common sense tells you it's fraudulent." In other words: "Tax
laws? We ain't got no tax laws. We don't have to show you any stinkin'
tax laws."
Or, as R.W. Grant, the libertarian poet, wrote in a similar context:
"The rule of law, in complex times,/ Has proved itself deficient./ We
much prefer the rule of men!/ It's vastly more efficient!" 3 9
In the end, neither the jury nor the federal district judge who heard
the case were impressed by the RICO charges. The government had
sought some $21 million in assets from the defendants. When the judge
asked the jury for their figure, they vastly reduced this figure. U.S. Dis-
trict Judge Robert L. Carter ordered forfeitures of only $1.6 million.
Even more significantly, despite the convictions, Judge Carter refused to
order any punishment for any of the defendants on the RICO charges.
Judge Carter dismissed the forfeitures sought by the government by cit-
ing the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines. Compar-
ing the "harshness of the penalty and the gravity of the offense," he
concluded that the benefits the defendants received were greatly dispro-
portionate to the penalty.40 He noted that he had "not been able to find
any case in which there has been any forfeiture ordered in a conviction
for tax fraud," and also cited the Justice Department's RICO guidelines
as a factor in his decision.4 1 Thus, this extraordinary RICO case created
37 Wall St. J., June 21, 1989, at BI1, col. 1.
38 See Crovitz, RICO Needs No Stinkin' Badges, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1989, at A3O, col. 3.
39 R.W. GRANT, THE INCREDIBLE BREAD MACHINE (1966), quoted in WORLD RESEARCH, INC., CAM-
PUS STUDIES INST. Div., THE INCREDIBLE BREAD MACHINE 174 (1974).
40 United States v. Regan, 726 F. Supp. 447,456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277, 292 (1983)).
41 Id. at 457.
[Vol. 65:1050
RICO AND WALL STREET
much smoke but no fire. On the other hand, it did result in some reforms
from the Justice Department.
Indeed, there is now some chance that there will be no more RICO
cases quite like Princeton/Newport. The Department of Justice now has
issued two amendments related to RICO for insertion into the Guide-
lines for U.S. Attorneys. Although some prosecutors have downplayed
their importance, it seems to me that these guidelines are nothing less
than an unprecedented departmental mea culpa for RICO abuses.
The first to become publicly known was from the Tax Division of the
Justice Department. This memorandum, reproduced as Appendix A,
generally prohibits U.S. Attorneys from bringing RICO or mail fraud
charges based on alleged tax violations. The memorandum states that
except under the "exceptional circumstances" of a tax shelter that vic-
timizes third parties, prosecutors abuse their power when they bring
RICO or mail fraud charges masquerading as tax charges. The memo-
randum states, "It is the position of the Tax Division that Congress in-
tended that tax crimes be charged as tax crimes," and not under some
other heading or criminal code.42 "Tax offenses are not predicates for
RICO offenses-a deliberate congressional decision-and charging a tax
offense as a mail fraud charge could be viewed as circumventing congres-
sional intent."
'43
It is worth noting that the rationale for this amendment to the U.S.
Attorneys Manual is the same as the reason that limits to fewer than
1,500 the annual number of federal criminal tax cases. This is because
tax law is so complex and the potential for prosecutorial abuse is so
great-who has never made some technical error filling out a tax form?-
that some central authority in the Justice Department must closely super-
vise which cases are brought and why. This explains why, almost unique
among all cases, U.S. Attorneys have routinely submitted proposed crim-
inal tax indictment, to the Tax Division at Justice for pre-filing approval.
This system reportedly broke down during Mr. Giuliani's tenure as U.S.
Attorney, and his cases proved that the vague RICO and mail fraud laws
give prosecutors too much discretion to bring quasi-tax cases.
The second amendment to the U.S. Attorneys Manual was made by
the Criminal Division of the Justice Department. This amendment, re-
printed as Appendix B, limits approval by the division for U.S. Attorneys
seeking to bring a motion for a temporary restraining order in connec-
tion with a case involving RICO forfeiture. It noted that "[s]uch order
can have a wide-ranging impact on third parties who do business with the
defendants, including clients, vendors, banks, investors, creditors, de-
pendents, and others." 44 It made an unusual reference to public criti-
cism of some abuses by the prosecutors. "Some highly publicized cases
involving RICO temporary restraining orders (TROs) have been the sub-
ject of considerable criticism in the press, because of a perception that
pre-trial freezing of assets is tantamount to a seizure of property without
42 See infra Appendix A, at 1069-70.
43 id at 720.
44 See infra Appendix B, at 1071-72.
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due process."' 45 It told prosecutors not to seek forfeitures if there are
"less intrusive" alternatives, such as bonds, and in any case not to seek
forfeitures "disproportionate to the defendant's crime."'46
These amendments to the U.S. Attorneys Manual came too late for
officials at Drexel Burnham Lambert, who felt forced to roll over even
before the Princeton/Newport case went to trial. Mr. Giuliani threatened
to bring a RICO indictment against the firm, with all the pre-trial penal-
ties that drove Princeton/Newport into liquidation. Fight the charges
and risk going out of business? Or try to settle on lesser charges? This
was the $650 million question for the board of directors of Drexel Burn-
ham Lambert, which decided that this amount in settlement of all the
charges was a fair price to pay to avoid being RICOed. The board voted
to agree to plead guilty to six charges, and convinced the prosecutors to
agree to let the firm make a very unusual stipulation in its settlement.
Drexel Burnham Lambert insisted on the right to plead guilty to charges
"which the company is not in a position to dispute."'47 The reason the
firm could not dispute the charges did not have anything to do with the
availability of evidence or able legal counsel. Instead, it is the very threat
of RICO that made a defense of a possible RICO charge impossible.
RICO clearly coerced the plea.
This coercion is not only offensive to notions ofjustice and due pro-
cess, but also appears to violate one of the most unambiguous sections of
the RICO Guidelines. "Inclusion of a RICO count in an indictment
solely or even primarily to create a bargaining tool for later plea negotia-
tions on lesser counts," the Guidelines say, "would not be appropriate
and would violate the Principles of Federal Prosecution."48
Next came the ninety-eight count indictment of Michael Milken and
others. The indictment was even more RICO-based than the earlier Marc
Rich indictment, which at least had some counts based on the alleged
underlying violations of the tax code. In the case of Mr. Milken, the
ninety-eight counts were presented purely as a racketeering case. Drexel
Burnham Lambert was repeatedly referred to as a "racketeering enter-
prise." The only references to the alleged underlying violations of the
securities laws are relegated to parenthetical references to sections of the
criminal code. Whether there will ever be a superseding indictment clari-
fying the securities and other charges involved, or whether this case goes
to trial or whether Mr. Milken and the others will also settle, blaming the
coercive aspects of RICO, at this writing remain to be seen.
There is something distinctly dissatisfying about pre-trial settle-
ments under these circumstances. Drexel Burnham Lambert has a very
good argument that it settled only because of the threat of a RICO law-
suit that on the precedent of Princeton/Newport could mean that the
firm would not last long enough to defend itself in court. On the other
hand, Mr. Giuliani can argue that his years of investigation of the firm
45 Id. at 723.
46 Id. at 724.
47 Giuliani's Legacy, Wall St.J., Oct. 25, 1989 at A18, col. 1 (editorial).
48 See Guidelines supra note 22, at § 9-110.310.
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finally paid off, and that the firm chose to settle in the face of the evi-
dence he had gathered.
The irresolution of the case is compounded by the fact that the
Drexel Burnham Lambert investigation was in the headlines for several
years, and led to congressional investigations and repeated citations by
the Securities and Exchange Commission as justification for huge new
budget increases. Criminal trials, with their convictions or their acquit-
tals, are supposed to be the final conclusions to these kinds of accusa-
tions of serious offenses. The troubling conclusion here is that no one
may ever know whether Drexel Burnham Lambert in fact did anything
wrong, or happened to get caught up in an essentially political persecu-
tion. There were many special interests-from entrenched corporate
managers to competing investment bankers-that did not hide their hos-
tility to the firm's pioneering work in high-yield "junk" bonds. Thus, to
the degree that RICO leads to ambiguous settlements by white-collar de-
fendants, both the defendants and society generally are robbed of the
liberating finality of a trial.
IV. Civil RICO Roams Wall Street and Main Street
As troubling as the criminal use of RICO has become, RICOs use as
a rubber hose in the civil context perhaps affects more people, and poses
an equally substantial threat to civil rights. RICO offers the lure of treble
damages plus lawyers fees to plaintiffs who bring private actions for dam-
ages against private defendants. Despite the fact that RICO is a title
within a broader law on criminal cases, by now the vast majority of RICO
cases are purely private, civil cases. Ironically, civil RICO was not even
part of the law as passed by the Senate. Only the House version included
civil RICO, which was added to RICO without even a conference on the
bill. This struck the Second Circuit Court of Appeals as highly significant:
The legislative history of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
gives little hint of the intended scope of private action under civil
RICO.... The decision to add a civil private damages provision was
made by a House subcommittee at the behest of Representative Sam
Steiger and the American Bar Association. The addition was not con-
sidered an important one, a remarkable fact which in itself indicates
that Congress did not intend the section to have the extraordinary im-
pact claimed for it. Indeed, when the Judiciary Committee initially in-
troduced the amended bill, it did not even announce to the House that
it had made the addition.
49
The court noted that there were only three statements regarding civil
RICO made on the floor of the House, one of which was simply to claim
that the treble damages provision was "another example of the antitrust
remedy going adapted for use against organized criminality." 5
0 Thus,
with almost no legislative debate or comment, RICO was extended as an
49 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 489-90 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479
(1985).
50 Id at 490.
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afterthought to cases between private citizens as a way to encourage pri-
vate suits against the Mob.
That civil suits were intended to be narrowly limited to cases in
which organized syndicates caused identifiable damages to private indi-
viduals is clear from the fact that this provision was basically a dead letter
for the first decade of the statute. The ABA found that there was one
federal court decision on civil RICO by 1972, only one other case by
1975 and only a total of nine civil RICO decisions by 1980. But by the
1985 publication date of the ABA report, there were some 300 such deci-
sions.5 1 By now, the number is in the thousands, with many more in the
pipeline. There are even publications aimed at keeping lawyers up to
date with new uses for RICO. One, the "Civil RICO Report" offers law-
yers weekly updates on how to use the law for the price of $495 a year.
52
In addition to the lure of treble damages and lawyers fees if the plaintiffs
can label the defendants as "racketeers," this of course greatly enhances
the settlement value of even the most frivolous case.
The range of civil RICO cases is as wide as those activities that can
allegedly amount to two predicates of "fraud" using the mails or the
wires. Here is a list of legitimate businesses that have been sued under
RICO to show the range of "racketeers":
AETNA Casualty and Surety, A.H. Robbins, Allstate Insurance, Amer-
ican Broadcasting Company, Arthur Anderson, Chase Manhattan
Bank, Citibank, Coopers and Lybrand, Dean Witter Reynolds, Exxon,
Ford, General Motors, E.F. Hutton, Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Loeb
Rhoades & Co., Merrill Lynch, Miller Brewing, Morgan Stanley, Pantry
Pride, Peat Marwick & Mitchell, Price Waterhouse, Prudential Life In-
surance, Shearson/American Express, State Farm Fire and Casualty,
Texaco, and Touche Ross. 5
3
There have been landlord-tenant, divorce and will cases brought as
RICO cases. More incredibly, there have been successful RICO suits
against anti-abortion demonstrators and even a RICO suit against a
weekly newspaper in upstate New York for daring to report and editorial-
ize on anti-abortion demonstrations. Does RICO pre-empt the First
Amendment?
V. The RICO Mindset
There is a deeper argument under the surface of the RICO debate.
Very few commentators believe that Congress intended anything like the
broad sweep of criminal targets and civil defendants now forced to con-
front the statute. The nine Supreme Court Justices in Sedima were unani-
mous that RICO was by 1985 already being applied in ways never
intended by Congress, but nine Justices held that only Congress could
correct the abuses under the statute. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by
51 See Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 3, at 55.
52 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) (1985).
53 THE RICO RACKET, supra note 2, at 27.
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three other Justices, suggested in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co. ,54 that RICO may well be unconstitutionally vague. He wrote:
No constitutional challenge to this law has been raised in the present
case, and so that issue is not before us. That the highest Court in the
land has been unable to derive from this statute anything more than
today's meager guidance bodes ill for the day when that challenge is
presented.55
Why, then, has there been such little progress made toward legislative
reform of RICO? Various proposals have been made, including one re-
quiring a criminal conviction under RICO before the filing of a civil suit,
which would reduce the number of civil actions dramatically. Congress
has not voted on any reform proposals, despite intense lobbying.
One possible explanation is that RICO fits nicely into the liability-
broadening, deep-pocket picking trend in American law of the past
twenty-five years. The crisis in tort law has made common law concepts
that were familiar to the last generation totally archaic to this generation.
It is now widely understood that liability has widened due to changes
such as the relaxation of the fault requirement and more liberal assess-
ment of punitive damages.5, The doctrine of "enterprise liability" has
held corporate defendants liable even where fault is hard and perhaps
impossible to establish. Punitive damages one-hundred times the amount
of the compensatory damages are awarded with some regularity. So part
of the allure of RICO, especially civil RICO, may be the same soak-the-
rich mentality that has altered the landscape of tort law generally. The
fact that a Ralph Nader group has gone to the length of picketing a
Washington, D.C., law firm that had lobbied for RICO reform is a sign
that the political stakes here are steep indeed.
There is also what might be called the moral relativism defense of
RICO, which equates the activities of organized criminals with the activi-
ties of legitimate businesses and is unable to differentiate between the
two. Under this view, the rigorous penalties of RICO are just as applica-
ble against an investment banker or accountant as against the head of a
Mafia family that runs drugs and commits murder. Indeed, defenders of
the RICO statute make this very argument. Robert Blakey, a Notre Dame
Law School professor who was an aide to Senator McClellan during the
drafting of RICO, defends the broad use of RICO under this very rea-
soning. "Mike Milken made $550 million in one year," Prof. Blakey said
in a Forbes magazine interview. "Nobody else made that much in the his-
tory of the country except Al Capone. What did he do? He cheated. What
was Milken doing? He cheated. Of course, Capone stole and killed to do
it."'57 Elsewhere, Professor Blakey has said:
Read the language [of RICO]. The language says 'any person.' There's
nothing about any person who happens to be a member of the mob, or
any persona whose name ends in a vowel. It says any person. Stop and
54 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
55 Idtl at 2909.
56 See generally P. HUBER, LiiLrry: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
57 Queenan, G. Robert Blakey versus Mihael Milken, Forbes, May 1, 1989, at 57, 60.
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think about it for a minute. It would be obscene if it were otherwise.
The statute doesn't apply to blue-collar people only, or no-collar peo-
ple only. It applies to everybody. 58
But in fact, of course, there are huge differences between the Mafia
and, say, Drexel Burnham Lambert. For one thing, the Mafia was set up
as a criminal enterprise. Drexel Burnham Lambert is a registered broker-
age. The Mafia makes money by committing crimes. Drexel Burnham
Lambert makes money by attracting clients. The Mafia gets involved with
legitimate businesses only as a deviation from its norm. If Drexel Burn-
ham Lambert broke the law, it would have been a deviation from its usual
pattern. Moreover, the kinds of activities that RICO envisioned as predi-
cates-murder, loansharking, gambling, extortion-are well-understood
crimes and there is very little doubt about the existence of a victim.
Under the indictment of Drexel Burnham Lambert, the alleged fraud has
the very curious feature that very few people have come forward to say
that they were harmed.
It is one of the great virtues of the American system of justice that
most legal abuses are committed in violation of the law, not in the name
of the law. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations law is a
leading exception to the rule. In the case of RICO, grotesque abuses of
our system of justice are paradoxically done in the name of this law.
It is doubtful that Congress would ever pass a criminal law that
equates criminal syndicates with legitimate businesses and private citi-
zens. Certainly this is not what Congress envisioned in 1970 when it
passed RICO. The question now is whether Congress will admit that its
faulty drafting has led to untold injustices. RICO has led to coerced
guilty pleas, which amount to legalized extortion. Out-of-court payments
to settle civil suits are little more than classic shakedowns. Indeed, it is no
exaggeration to conclude that until Congress finally repeals this outra-
geous statute or the Supreme Court invalidates it, RICO will remain the
real racket.
58 Nightline: RICO (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 12, 1989).
[Vol. 65:1050
RICO AND WALL STREET
APPENDIX A
TO: Holders of United States Attorneys' Manual Title 6
FROM: United States Attorneys' Manual Staff




RE: Charging the Filing or Causing the Filing of False Income Tax Re-
turns as Mail-Fraud and/or as Mail Fraud Predicates to a RICO
Charge
NOTE: 1. This is issued pursuant to USAM 1-1.550.
2. Distribute to Holders of Title 6.
3. Insert at end of USAM Title 6.
AFFECTS: USAM 6-4.211(1)
PURPOSE: This bluesheet implements prosecutive policy concerning
the use of mail fraud charges and mail fraud predicates for
RICO where the filing of false tax returns or forms is in-
volved.
The following supplements 6-4.211 Tax Division Jurisdiction with a
new subsection 6-4.211 (1) Filing False Tax Returns: Mail Fraud Charges
or Mail Fraud Predicates for RICO.
The authorization of the Tax Division is required before charging
mail fraud counts either independently or as predicate acts to a RICO
charge: (1) when the only mailing charged is a tax return or other inter-
nal revenue form or document; or (2) when the mailing charged is a mail-
ing used to promote or facilitate a scheme which is essentially only a tax
fraud scheme (e.g., a tax shelter).' Such authorization will be granted
only in exceptional circumstances as explained below.
The filing of a false tax return, which almost invariably involves a
mailing, is a tax crime chargeable under 26 U.S.C. 7206(1) (if the violator
is the taxpayer) or 25 U.S.C. 7206(2) (if the violator is, for example, a tax
return preparer or tax shelter promoter). It is the position of the Tax
Division that Congress intended that tax crimes be charged as tax crimes
and that the specific criminal law provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code should form the focus of prosecutions when essentially tax law vio-
lation motives are involved, even though other crimes may technically
have been committed. See, United States v. Henderson, 386 F. Supp. 1048,
1052-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).2
Under certain narrowly defined circumstances, however, a mail fraud
prosecution predicated on a mailing of an internal revenue form or docu-
ment, or where the scheme involved is essentially a tax fraud scheme,
might be appropriate in addition to, but never in lieu of, applicable sub-
stantive tax charges. See, United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 48-49 (2d
I A scheme does not fall in the latter category if it is designed to defraud individuals or to defraud
the government in a non-revenue collecting capacity.
2 The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d 1204, 1216 (9th Cir. 1976) cert denied,
430 U.S. 930 (1977) in footnote 17 stated a contrary position, but did not analyze the issue as it was
not squarely presented. The case involved corporate diversion and possible fraud on creditors as
well as tax evasion.
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Cir. 1978) (where the defendant filed false refund claims on behalf of
others, thereby acting more like a thief in the traditional sense). Such a
situation could arise in a tax shelter or other tax fraud case, when individ-
uals, through no deliberate fault of their own, were demonstrably victim-
ized as a result of a defendant's fraudulent scheme and use of a mail
fraud charge is necessary to achieve some legitimate, practical purpose
like securing restitution for the individual victims. The fact that a defend-
ant committed conduct which independently victimized individuals is to
be reflected in the mail fraud allegations in the indictment. Mail fraud
charges could also be used in a tax fraud case when the government was
also victimized in a non-revenue collecting capacity. See, e.g., United States
v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987) (case involving primarily
false contract claims). However, to the extent victimization of third par-
ties constitutes an exception to the general rule, the evidence must
demonstrate direct, substantial victimization as opposed to a general or
theoretical harm to a general class of victims.
Normally, in a tax shelter case, the mere imposition of interest and
penalties on the investors will not constitute sufficient victimization to
warrant the use of mail fraud charges in addition to tax charges. How-
ever, each individual case will be reviewed on its merits to determine
whether the degree of culpability of the individual investors is such as to
treat them more as victims than participants in the particular scheme.
Among the factors to consider are the existence of bona fide pending
civil suits against the promoters by the investors, the nature and degree
of misrepresentations made to the investors, and the degree of in-
dependent losses beyond the tax liability.
A similar policy will be followed with respect to the filing of RICO
charges predicated on mail fraud charges which in turn involve essen-
tially only a tax fraud scheme. Tax offenses are not predicates for RICO
offenses-a deliberate Congressional decision-and charging a tax of-
fense as a mail fraud charge could be viewed as circumventing Congres-
sional intent unless unique circumstances justifying the use of a mail
fraud charge are present.
However, once a decision has been made by the Tax Division to au-
thorize mail fraud charges, the decision whether to authorize a RICO
charge in turn based on these mail fraud charges is one for the Criminal
Division to make.
For a determination as to whether a mail fraud charge predicated on
the mailing of internal revenue forms or documents is appropriate, the
Tax Division should be consulted early in the investigation rather than
waiting until a last minute decision is needed.
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APPENDIX B
TO: Holders of United States Attorneys' Manual Title 9
FROM: United States Attorneys' Manual Staff
Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
RE: Temporary Restraining Orders Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(d)
AFFECTS: USAM 9-110.300, et seq.
PURPOSE: This bluesheet implements new policy regarding the re-
quirement of approval by the Organized Crime and Racke-
teering Section prior to filing a motion for a temporary re-
straining order under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) in connection
with a case involving RICO forfeiture.
The following should be added after USAM 9-110.413: 9-110.414:
Temporary Restraining Orders
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d), the government may seek a temporary
restraining order (TRO) upon the filing of a RICO indictment, in order
to preserve all forfeitable assets until the trial is completed and judgment
entered. Such orders can have a wide-ranging impact on third parties
who do business with the defendants, including clients, vendors, banks,
investors, creditors, dependents, and others. Some highly publicized
cases involving RICO TROs have been the subject of considerable criti-
cism in the press, because of a perception that pre-trial freezing of assets
is tantamount to a seizure of property without due process. In order to
ensure that the rights of all interested parties are protected, the Criminal
Division has instituted the following requirements to control the use of
TROs in RICO prosecutions. (It should be noted that these require-
ments are in addition to any other existing requirements, such as review
by the Asset Forfeiture Office.):
1. As part of the approval process for RICO prosecutions, the prose-
cutor must submit any proposed forfeiture TRO for review by the Or-
ganized Crime and Racketeering Section. The prosecutor must show
that less-intrusive remedies (such as bonds) are not likely to preserve
the assets for forfeiture in the event of a conviction.
2. In seeking approval of a TRO, the prosecutor must articulate any
anticipated impact that forfeiture and the TRO would have on inno-
cent third parties, balanced against the government's need to preserve
the assets.
3. In deciding whether forfeiture (and, hence, a TRO) is appropriate,
the Section will consider the nature and severity of the offense; the
government's policy is not to seek the fullest forfeiture permissible
under the law where that forfeiture would be disproportionate to the
defendant's crime.
4. When a RICO TRO is being sought, the prosecutor is required, at
the earliest appropriate time, to state publicly that the government's
request for a TRO, and eventual forfeiture, is made in full recognition
of the rights of third parties-that is, in requesting the TRO, the gov-
ernment will not seek to disrupt the normal, legitimate business activi-
ties of the defendant; will not seek through use of the relation-back
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doctrine to take from third parties assets legitimately transferred to
them; will not seek to vitiate legitimate business transactions occurring
between the defendant and third parties; and will, in all other respects,
assist the court in ensuring that the rights of third parties are pro-
tected, through proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1) and otherwise.
The Division expects that the prosecutor will announce these princi-
ples either at the time the indictment is returned or, at the latest, at the
first proceeding before the court concerning the TRO.
